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Abstract. A crucial issue in efficiency-equality evaluations of tax reforms
resides in the possibility that the level as well as the distribution of welfare
may change, where the household-specific measures of welfare capture the
value of income as well as the value of leisure. A better-designed redistribu-
tion and income support system may not only foster equality but also
improve the configuration of incentives and by this route contribute in its turn
to efficiency. This paper presents an empirical analysis of the welfare effects
for married couples of replacing the Italian tax system by three alternative
hypothetical reforms: a flat tax, a negative income tax, and a work fare
scheme. We employ a microeconometric model of household labour supply
that represents partners’ simultaneous choices, allows for constraints in the
choice of hours of work, and is sufficiently flexible to capture a large variety
of supply responses. These features appear to be crucial in the evaluation of
reform effects. The results suggest that there is scope for improving upon the
current system under both the efficiency and the equality criterion. The
benefits from the reforms, however, come from unexpected directions since
the largest labour supply contribution come from poor and middle class
households whereas rich households appear to be much less responsive to
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1. Introduction
In the last few years a debate has developed in Italy upon reforming the
tax-transfer treatment of households. Although with some delay, the debate
follows closely enough policy discussions that are going on in other OECD
countries, and moves around two focal issues. The first one concerns the
possibly large loss in efficiency due to disincentives and distortions on worker
behaviour caused by progressive taxation. The reform proposals that are
mainly motivated by such arguments tend to suggest a flatter profile of the
marginal tax rates (with the pure ‘‘flat tax’’ as a limit case) together with a
reduction of the levels of the tax rates. The second issue stems from the
widespread observation that the current Italian system of transfers and
benefits directly or indirectly related to supporting the life standard of needy
or poor or in any sense disadvantaged households performs rather poorly
both in terms of cost-effectiveness and fairness. The reform proposals that are
mainly inspired by this concern by and large converge in supporting some
more or less universal basic transfer, or basic guaranteed level of income, or
basic endowment.
The picture is mirrored into the political platforms of alternative coali-
tions. Since the publication of a ‘‘Libro Bianco’’ on behalf of the Ministry of
Finance in 19941, up to the tax reform proposals contained in the 2001
election platform, the quest for lower and ‘‘flatter’’ tax rates has been sup-
ported with more energy by the centre-right coalition (‘‘Casa delle Liberta’’),
while the concern for a more equitable and cost-effective system of income
support and redistribution has been more a policy focus of the recent centre-
left governments2 (‘‘Ulivo’’) as well as of the electoral platform of the centre-
left coalition. It must be recognised however that the two issues are more
complementary than alternative. For example, a non-technical article by
Rizzi and Rossi (1997) proposes an overall reform of the tax-transfer system
combining a basic universal transfer with a flat tax, very much in line with the
arguments developed in Atkinson (1995). A similar proposal, under the label
of ‘‘Social Dividend’’, was included in the 2001 electoral platform of the
centre-left coalition3.
Previous exercises applied to Italy have adopted non-behavioural simu-
lations for evaluating reforms similar to the ones mentioned above.4 When
account is not taken of behavioural responses, the dimension of the (gross)
‘‘cake’’ is obviously fixed. However, the crucial issue in efficiency-equality
evaluation resides precisely in the possibility that the dimension (along with
the distribution) of the cake may change. Less distortionary tax rates may
generate a larger amount of resources available for redistribution; a better
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designed redistribution and income support system may not only foster
equality but also improve the configuration of incentives and by this route
contribute in its turn to efficiency. In this paper we use a model of household
labour supply to evaluate stylised versions of the above reform ideas. A
behavioural model might reveal the possibility of improving both efficiency
and equality. We use a pre-estimated household labour supply model, briefly
described in Appendix A.
The social evaluation methodology we use is a generalisation of King
(1983), where measures of welfare are derived from equivalent incomes de-
fined in terms of a reference household and of the prices (wages) and
opportunities that this household faces. The introduction of a reference state
(household characteristics, market opportunities and prices) is made in order
to compare welfare across households and opportunity sets:5 A recent
example of a policy simulation exercise using a consistent social evaluation
methodology that is close to the one adopted in this paper is provided by
Fortin et al. (1993). Their study, however, relies on a calibrated (not esti-
mated) and a rather restrictive model of household labour supply based on a
Stone-Geary utility function that has not been subjected to empirical testing.
The methodology for welfare evaluation is explained in Sect. 2, whilst the
tax reforms in question and a brief outline of the 1993 tax regime are de-
scribed in Sect. 3 and Appendix B. The simulation results are also reported in
Sect. 3. Sect. 4 provides concluding remarks.
2. Behavioural micro-simulation and welfare evaluation
The simulation tool is a microeconometric model of household labour supply,
previously estimated on 1993 data. Some essential features of the model are
synthetically illustrated in Appendix A6. Here we recall the general format of
the estimation and policy simulation steps. The i-th household (a couple) is
assumed to choose a ‘‘job’’ from a choice-set Xi. The choice set specification
accounts for quantity constraints, limits to the choice of work hours and
different opportunities between households and genders. Each job alternative
contains wife’s gross wage rate wiF , husband’s wage rate wiM , wife’s hours of
work hiF , husband’s hours of work hiF and unobserved (by the analysts) job
characteristics z. As examples of z we can think of commuting time,
environmental characteristics of the job, skill content of the job etc. The
choice set contains also non-market activities, i.e., jobs with w ¼ 0 and h ¼ 0.
Let Yi ¼ wiF hiF þ wiMhiM þ mi be the gross household income associated with
a particular job, where mi represent other (exogenous) income. Net household
income under tax-transfer regime k will then be Cki ¼ Yi  Rk ðwiF hiF ;
wiMhiM ;miÞ, where RkðÞ – a function of gross incomes-ðð lmÞÞrepresents the
tax-transfer rule that computes the net tax to be paid under tax-transfer
regime k. Preferences are represented by the utility function UiðCki ; hiF ; hiM ; zÞ.
The i-th household then solves the problem
max
ðCki ; hiF ; hiM ; zÞ2Xi
UiðCki ; hiF ; hiM ; zÞ
s:t:
Cki ¼ Yi  RkðwiF hiF ;wiMhiM ;miÞ
ð2:1Þ
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The observed 1993 behaviour is assumed to be generated by the solution of
the problem above under the 1993 tax-transfer regime. The data set used
includes 2160 married couples in age 18 – 54 belonging to the 1993 Bank-of-
Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW93). On the basis of
observed behaviour we estimate the utility function and the parameters of the
choice sets7. The simulation consists in solving
max
ðCki ; hiF ; hiM ; zÞ2Xi
UiðCki ; hiF ; hiM ; zÞ
s:t:
Cki ¼ Yi  Rki ðwiF hiF ;wiMhiM ;miÞ
X
i
Rki wiF hiF ;wiMhiM ;mið Þ ¼
X
i
R1993i
ð2:2Þ
The first constraint is the i-th household’s budget constraint. The second one
is the constant-tax-revenue constraint and concerns all households.
Let Vi Xi;mi;Rk
 
represent the maximum utility level attained by house-
hold i, endowed with exogenous income mi, facing choice set Xi and tax-
transfer rule Rk. Let us consider now a reference household S that faces choice
set XS , and a reference tax-transfer rule RS . We ask what is the exogenous
income yki that would allow the reference household in the reference setting to
reach utility Vi Xi;mi;Rki
 
:
Vi Xi;mi;Rk
  ¼ VS XS ; yki ;RS
  ð2:3Þ
Thus, yki ¼ yki Xi;Rk;mi; XS ;RS
 
is a generalisation of the concept of indirect
money-metric utility as defined in Varian (1992) or in King (1983)–where it is
called equivalent income.8 The use of a reference choice set XS and a reference
tax-transfer rule RS allows comparisons between policy reforms defined by
changes in R and/or X. The use of a reference household (or reference
household characteristics) makes it meaningful to compare and aggregate the
household-specific equivalent incomes.
Let us suppose the status quo is some tax-transfer rule R0. Under this
regime, household i attains utility level Vi Xi;mi;R0
 
. The money-metric
representation y0i of this utility level is implicitly defined by
Vi Xi;mi;R0
  ¼ VS XS ; y0i ;RS
  ð2:4Þ
Now, a new tax-transfer rule R1 is introduced. The corresponding equivalent
income y1i is defined by
Vi Xi;mi;R1i
  ¼ VS XS ; y1i ;RS
  ð2:5Þ
The equivalent incomes y1i and y
0
i for household i represent the levels of
(exogenous) income that affords the reference household S the same level of
utility under the reference choice set XS and the reference tax-transfer system
RS as household i attains under tax systems R1 and R0 (and choice set Xi).
Thus, the difference between y1i and y
0
i for household i emerges as an
appropriate measure of the household-specific welfare effect of changing tax-
transfer system from R0 to R1. Moreover, since the money values of the
household’s utilities are defined in terms of a reference household who faces
fixed prices and a fixed choice set, this welfare measure are comparable across
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households. The difference between the two equivalent incomes can be
interpreted as a monetary measure of welfare change and we will call it
Comparable Welfare Gain:
CWGi ¼ y1I  y0i ð2:6Þ
We use flat tax (FT) as the reference tax system. The reason for this choice is
that the evaluation of the equivalent income defined by Eq. (2.3) is
computationally much more convenient if the reference system is a system
where tax rates are not subject to choice. Any alternative reference tax system
will imply endogenous tax rates. The reference tax-transfer rule will be the FT
rule (defined above) that generates the same net revenue as the actual 1993
rule.
It should be emphasised that due to the random utilities employed here we
have to perform stochastic simulations in order to generate the distribution of
the CWGs. The decile-specific mean values of CWG are reported in Sect. 3.
As indicated above the CWG-values may depend on the choice of refer-
ence household. Thus, it is important to examine the sensitivity of the results
with regard to the choice of reference household. In the simulation exercise
that follows, we have alternatively used - as reference - the household (and the
corresponding choice set) with the lowest, the median and the highest ob-
served income. The results, however, are very similar; therefore, to simplify
the exposition, we only report the results obtained when using the median
income household as reference.
Although the distributions of CWG generated by alternative tax reforms
provide important information for evaluating the welfare effects of tax re-
forms, a complete ranking of these distributions may require the use of a
social welfare function. Moreover, social welfare functions serve as primary
quantities for summarising the information content of the distribution of
CWGs. In this study we use the following family of rank-dependent social
welfare functions
Wb;k ¼
Z1
0
pbðtÞF 1k ðtÞdt; b ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; ð2:7Þ
where F 1k is the left inverse of the cumulative distribution function of
equivalent income under tax-transfer rule k and pb(t) is a weight function
defined by
pbðtÞ ¼  log t; b ¼ 1b
b1 1 tb1
 
b ¼ 2; 3; . . .

ð2:8Þ
where b is the inequality aversion parameter9. Note that the inequality
aversion decreases when b increases. It follows by straightforward calcula-
tions that Wb;k  lk=mean of the distribution FkðyÞ, and that Wb;k is equal to
lk if and only if Fk is the egalitarian distribution. Thus, Wb;k can be interpreted
as the equally distributed equivalent level of equivalent income under tax
regime k.
Aaberge (2000) demonstrated that the following family of inequality
measures,
Cb;k ¼ 1 Wb;klk
; b ¼ 1; 2; . . . ð2:9Þ
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yields a complete characterisation of the distribution function Fk provided
that the mean is known10. Moreover, Aaberge (2000) argued that the use of a
few of these inequality measures may give a good summarisation of inequality
in the distribution function.
When the tax-benefit rule is changed from R0 to R1 expression (2.9) can be
exploited to measure the proportionate social gain11 defined by the expression
nb ¼
Wb;1
Wb;0
¼ l1 1 Cb;1
 
l0 1 Cb;0
  : ð2:10Þ
Expression (2.10) shows that the effect on social welfare can be decomposed
into the product of the efficiency effect l1l0
and the equality effect
1Cb;1ð Þ
1Cb;0ð Þ. In the
limiting case when b fi ¥, fb reduces to the ratio between the means of the
post- and pre-reform equivalent incomes. Therefore we also have:
nb ¼ n1
1 Cb;1
 
1 Cb;0
  ð2:11Þ
3. Tax reforms
Since the model we use for the tax simulations is estimated on 1993 data, we
take the 1993 tax rule as the status quo (R0). It is essentially a system of
increasing marginal tax rates, going from 10% (up to 7,2 millions of ITL) to
50% (over 300 millions of ITL), which are applied to individual total annual
income. For more details we refer to the Appendix B. Since 1993 the number
of brackets has been reduced, but the essential characteristics of the system
are still the same.12
The hypothetical reforms are stylised representations of ideas that – as
mentioned in section 1 – are a matter of debate and proposal in Italy as well
as in other OECD countries, with differing focus on different aspects of the
tax regime. On the one hand there is a quest for a flatter profile of the
marginal tax rates in order to reduce disincentives and enhance efficiency13.
On the other hand, and specifically in Italy, it is recognised that the system of
basic income support provides transfers that are not cost-effective and do not
respond to any explicit design of social or family policy, and that therefore
the system needs to be rationalised on a more transparent and universalistic
basis. Under different labels, the ideas belonging to this second strand, con-
verge on proposing some type of basic income scheme, either in the form of a
universal transfer or in the form of transfer that compensate incomes up to a
basic level. The quests for more efficiency via a flatter tax profile and for more,
or not less, equality via a more cost-effective system of income support are far
from being mutually exclusive. In fact many proposals (e.g. Atkinson 1995
and, for Italy Rizzi and Rossi 1997, and more recently Ministero del Tesoro
2000) match a flat tax with a basic income scheme. In what follows, we
evaluate three different systems that in one way or another can satisfy these
criteria. The first is a proportional or flat tax (FT). If Y represents total gross
income, the tax RFT to be paid by the household is
RFT ¼ tFT Y ð3:1Þ
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where tFT is a constant marginal tax rate. Besides incorporating the idea of
minimising distortions, it is also a benchmark system, useful for comparison.
As mentioned above it will also be used as the reference tax rule since it is
computationally convenient to do so.
The second reform is a simple negative income tax (NIT), where a flat tax
is complemented with a transfer (a negative tax) that guarantees households’
income up to a basic level G14:
RNIT ¼ Y  G if Y  G
tNIT ðY  GÞ if Y  G

ð3:2Þ
Last, we consider the so-called WorkFare (WF) system, which essentially
is a modification of NIT where the transfer is received only if the household
works a minimum required amount of hours15,
RWF ¼
0 if Y  G and H < Hmin
Y  G if Y  G and H > Hmin
tWF ðY  GÞ if Y  G
8
<
: ð3:3Þ
where tWF is a constant marginal tax rate, H represent the total hours worked
by the wife and the husband and Hmin is a minimum required number of
hours worked (set equal to 1000 in the simulation). Although similar to the
NIT, the WF system is interesting to analyse, both because it may have better
chances to receive political support and because of the theoretical argument
according to which under certain conditions it can be proved to be Pareto-
superior to NIT.16
Note that RFT ;RNIT and RWF are functions of the wife and husband’s
earnings and the other income of the couple. NIT and WF are interpreted as
reforms that try to compound the criterion of lessening distortions from high
marginal tax rates and the criterion of redesigning the basic income support
system in a more effective way. Since the actual basic income support policies
are thought to be rather wasteful and occasionally even inequitable, there
might be scope for reforms that are able to increase both efficiency and
equality.
For each of the reforms illustrated above, the simulation consists in
solving problem (2.2). For each reform there is a marginal tax rate that must
be endogenously determined by the simulation as the one generating the same
total tax revenue as of 1993, given the other parameters of the tax-transfer
rules17. The constant-revenue marginal tax rates turn out to be 0.184 (FT),
0.284 (NIT) and 0.273 (WF). The average net tax rate (i.e., the ratio of total
net tax revenue to total gross income) is 0.20 under 1993 regime and goes
down to 0.184 (FT), 0.198 (NIT) and 0.195 (WF). Since net tax revenue is
kept constant, the result of a lower average tax rate reveals that all the re-
forms induce behavioural changes that generate a larger total gross income.18
As a way of summarising the basic behavioural features implied by the
model, before entering the illustration of reforms simulation, in Table 1 we
show the labour supply elasticity with respect to wage, broken down by
gender and household income. They are obtained by increasing gross wages
by 1%, computing the new labour supply choices individual by individual and
then averaging across the sample. We observe a very clear-cut difference of
responsiveness between wife and husband and a marked inverse dependence
of elasticity on household income19. This pattern of elasticities suggests that
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women living in low or average income households play a crucial role in
determining reform effects, provided the reform implies significant changes in
incentives for them. Table 1 also reveals that cross-elasticities – again mostly
for women in low and average income brackets – are far from irrelevant, thus
giving support to the choice of modelling the joint decisions by household
members. Below we suggest that they significantly contribute in explaining
some apparently counterintuitive results.
Tables 2–5 illustrate the simulation results under various perspectives.
Table 2 shows the simulated effects of the alternative tax rules upon labour
supply, gross income and disposable income. All the reforms lead to an in-
crease of average household gross and net income. As expected the FT
scheme creates less distortion on labour supply than the NIT and WF
schemes. However, compared to observed labour supply under the 1993 tax
rules female labour supply has a small reduction as a consequence of NIT, a
small increase as a consequence of WF, and a slightly larger increase as a
consequence of FT. However, whatever the reform, labour supply among
females in the first two poorest deciles always increases. In other words, no
significant disincentives to participation or any ‘‘poverty trap’’ effects emerge
in the lowest two deciles20. Among the possible explanation of this apparently
counterintuitive result, we stress two. First, the pattern of cross-elasticities
reported in Table 1 shows that the cross elasticity of labour supply for the
wives in the two poorest deciles (with respect to the husband’s wage) is
positive (0.82%). Also, for a majority of men, the marginal wage rate
increases as a consequence of any of the reforms, particularly on full-time
jobs. Given the positive cross-elasticity, this leads to an increase in the wife’s
labour supply. Second, there is a possible effect of the interactions of the
reforms with the quantity constraints on the hours choice. As explained in
Appendix A, the model accounts for the fact that not every type of job is
equally available to every individual. If, for example, part-time jobs are hard
Table 1. Labour supply elasticity for married females and married males by deciles of household
disposable income
Type of elasticity Female elasticity Male elasticity
Own wage
elasticities
Cross
elasticities
Own wage
elasticities
Cross
elasticities
Elasticity of the
probability of
participation
1 2.40 0.26 0.04 )0.02
2 1.35 )0.19 0.05 )0.02
3–8 0.54 )0.18 0.01 )0.01
9 0.16 )0.16 0.02 )0.01
10 0.10 )0.15 0.02 0.00
Elasticity of the
conditional
expectation
of total supply
of hours
1 1.60 0.55 0.28 0.08
2 0.83 0.05 0.12 0.02
3–8 0.18 )0.06 0.08 )0.02
9 0.04 )0.04 0.06 )0.02
10 0.04 )0.02 0.04 )0.02
Elasticity of the
unconditional
expectation of total
supply of hours
1 4.44 0.82 0.32 0.06
2 2.31 )0.15 0.17 0.00
3–8 0.73 )0.24 0.10 )0.04
9 0.20 )0.20 0.08 )0.03
10 0.13 )0.17 0.06 )0.02
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to find, at least for some women, the relevant comparison is the one between
non-participation and full-time jobs. In a sense, the average net wage rate
becomes more relevant than the marginal net wage. Thus, it may well be the
case that a reform implies a higher (compared to the 1993 system) net income
on a full-time job. This effect will encourage participation even if the entrance
marginal tax rate is higher (FT) or if unearned income increases (NIT and
WF). Note that a traditional model, where different job type availability is
not taken into account, could not have captured such an effect. Overall, it is
worthwhile noting that the specific features of the microeconometric model
employed – partners’ simultaneous choices, constraints in the choice of hours
and ability to capture a large variety of supply responses – turn out to be
crucial in explaining the simulation results.
In Table 3 we present the mean value CWGs of the three reforms outlined
above, disaggregated by 1993 household welfare decile and by ‘‘winners’’ and
‘‘losers’’. For each reform, three simulation exercises have been performed,
using three different reference households. However, since the results are
Table 2. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, disposable income and taxes
for married couples under alternative tax regimes by deciles of disposable household income
under 1993-taxes
Tax
regime
Decile Participation
rates, %
Annual hours of work Households, 1000 ITL 1993
M F Given
participation
In the total
population
Gross
income
Taxes Disposable
income
M F M F
1993-tax
rules
1 95.6 14.1 1571 1030 1501 145 15221 525 14695
2 97.5 19.9 1832 1209 1787 241 24372 2109 22263
3–8 98.9 43.8 1991 1546 1970 677 48187 8960 39227
9 99.3 65.5 2117 1731 2103 1133 85135 19983 65152
10 99.4 74.4 2237 1828 2225 1361 128396 34365 94032
All 98.5 43.7 1972 1590 1943 694 54225 11074 43150
FT 1 95.4 19.6 1706 1264 1627 247 22933 4219 18714
2 97.8 24.4 1924 1397 1882 342 31761 5845 25917
3–8 99.0 44.7 2048 1585 2027 709 54142 9961 44181
9 99.4 64.5 2162 1741 2150 1124 89459 16460 72999
10 99.5 73.2 2267 1834 2257 1344 132888 24452 108435
All 98.6 45.0 2036 1623 2008 731 60189 11074 49115
NIT 1 95.28 14.44 1551 1056 1478 152 16404 )1952 18356
2 97.13 19.91 1820 1240 1768 247 26199 2537 23662
3–8 98.63 41.42 1996 1540 1969 638 49801 9538 40263
9 99.21 63.29 2138 1733 2121 1097 86985 20218 66767
10 99.49 72.59 2252 1832 2241 1331 130581 32714 97867
All 98.29 41.87 1976 1589 1942 665 55897 11074 44823
WF 1 95.32 15.19 1621 1117 1545 170 17655 )247 17902
2 97.45 20.28 1866 1285 1818 260 27280 2956 24324
3–8 98.82 42.20 2018 1548 1994 653 50669 9487 41182
9 99.31 63.56 2145 1738 2130 1105 87455 19569 67885
10 99.49 72.96 2256 1833 2244 1338 131013 31538 99476
All 98.45 42.52 2001 1597 1970 679 56742 11074 45668
Notes: The results for WF are new, while the results for 1993, FT and NIT are taken from
Aaberge et al. (2000).
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similar, for simplicity of exposition we only report the results obtained with
the median income household as reference21. All the reforms are more effi-
cient than the 1993 rule, since for each reform the overall average CWG is
positive. Also the overall proportion of winners is always positive. However,
the distributional effects are very different. It seems clear that FT is dis-
equalising, since the average CWG is negative for the worst-off fraction of the
sample. Also, there is a majority of losers in the worst-off deciles. On the
other hand the results of Table 3 suggest that NIT and WF might be
equalising, since the only decile to loose is the best-off one. Note that the
identification of the proportions of winners and losers solely requires ordinal
utility information. Thus, the estimates of the proportions of winners and
losers are independent of the choice of reference state.
In Tables 4 and 5 we extend the analysis to the social welfare effect and its
components. We use Wb;k defined by (2.7) and (2.8) for b ¼ 1; 2; 3 and 1
The corresponding measures of social welfare have been calculated for both
the pre- and post-reform distributions of equivalent income. The values of
proportionate social gain nb defined by (2.10) are given in Table 4. All the
reforms produce a positive social gain for any value of the inequality aversion
parameter b. As we have noted above, n1 ignores distributional effects and
solely captures the efficiency gains of the reform. In other words, the last
column of Table 4 contains the ratio between the average equivalent income
under a certain reform and the average equivalent income under the 1993 rule.
Thus, if we only care about efficiency we look at the last column and read that
social gain is 2.1% under FT, 0.8% under NIT and 1.1% under WF. If we
also care about the distribution of equivalent income, and we adopt – say – a
Gini welfare function (i.e. we use (2.7) with b ¼ 2), then the social gain is
Table 3. The distribution of CWG by losers and winners, and by deciles of household equivalent
income1 under 1993-taxes when the 1993 tax regime is replaced by various alternative tax regimes
Tax-transfer
rule
Deciles Winners %
of the total
Average CWG in 1000 ITL
population All couples Losers Winners
FT 1 41.5 )122 )5228 7051
2 43.5 457 )5641 8310
3–8 52.0 2848 )6029 11058
9 60.1 6307 )6607 14926
10 60.9 7325 )8299 17460
All 51.8 3105 )6121 11703
NIT 1 65.3 3039 )2620 6082
2 59.2 2208 )2762 5634
3–8 54.6 1736 )3998 6526
9 51.4 1573 )5595 8408
10 46.1 )808 )9719 9726
All 55.0 1643 )4640 6821
WF 1 64.8 2750 )2656 5732
2 59.3 2165 )2773 5540
3–8 55.4 1835 )3958 6531
9 52.6 1793 )5551 8459
10 47.6 )478 )9668 9776
All 55.6 1724 )4594 6790
1 Equivalent income and CWG are defined using the median income household as reference
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0.9% under FT, 1.5% under NIT and 1.6% under WF. As we can see
from (2.10) or (2.11), the proportionate social gain of Table 4 can be fac-
tored into the efficiency effect (i.e. n1) and the equality effect (i.e.,
1 Cb;1
 
= 1 Cb;0
 
). Table 5 reports the equality effects. The reforms are
equalising (disequalising) if the entries are greater (lower) than 1. For
example, equality is increased by 0.7% under the NIT reform when we em-
ploy the Gini welfare function (i.e., b ¼ 2).
Table 4 and Table 5 together reveal that all the reforms attain a positive
social gain but through a different route. Namely, FT is efficient but dis-
equalising; the social gain is positive since the efficiency effect more than
compensates the disequalising effect, even when social welfare function (the
Bonferroni welfare function, b ¼ 1) exhibits rather strong inequality aversion.
On the other hand, NIT and WF are both efficient and equalising with respect
to the 1993 rule. It appears therefore that it is possible to overcome the trade-
off between efficiency and equality. NIT and WF just provide two examples.
It is worthwhile noting however that the benefits from the reforms seem to
come from an unexpected direction. Most advocates of lower marginal tax
rates for higher incomes (as it is true of all the three reforms we have simu-
lated) tend to think that the rich are more responsive than the poor.
According to this view, thanks to better incentives, the rich would increase
labour supply and take up more productive opportunities, and by this way
they would contribute to a bigger cake. Looking into the details of our
simulation, however, we discover that what happens is quite the opposite.
Table 2 reveals that the largest response to the reforms in terms of hours
comes from households belonging to low and average income deciles. This is
also consistent with the pattern of supply elasticities presented in Table 1. The
reforms we have simulated indeed exploit already some of the implications of
this pattern of behavioural responses, by lowering marginal taxes also for
some fraction of the average income population. For example, an individual
income of 30,000,000 ITL (somewhat above the average individual income in
1993) would face – according to 1993 tax rule – a marginal tax rate equal to
34%. For the same income, the marginal tax rates under the reforms would
be lower (FT: 18.4%; NIT: 28.4%; WF: 27.3%). Moreover, under NIT and
Table 4. Proportionate social gain under the tax-transfer reforms
Tax-transfer
rule
nb
b = 1 b = 2 b = 3 b = 1
FT 1.002 1.009 1.012 1.021
NIT 1.020 1.015 1.013 1.008
WF 1.019 1.016 1.015 1.011
Table 5. Equality effects of the tax-transfer reforms
Tax-transfer
rule
1 Cb;1
 
= 1 Cb;0
 
b = 1 b = 2 b = 3
FT 0.981 0.988 0.991
NIT 1.012 1.007 1.005
WF 1.008 1.005 1.004
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WF rules, the reformed marginal tax rates – although rather low in absolute
terms – are high enough to finance a guaranteed income such that both rules
turn out to be also equalising (besides being more efficient with respect to the
1993 regime). However, for the very high incomes – say those facing a 51%
marginal tax rate – the gain is obviously much higher, although their supply
elasticity is close to zero. NIT or WF might probably be improved upon for
example by using a two-rate tax instead of the flat rate, with the lower rate
imposed on low and average incomes. Interestingly enough, a tax-transfer
rule of this sort appears to enlarge the scope for an improvement of both
efficiency and equality, since then lower tax rates would fall upon the indi-
viduals who are both more elastic and poorer.22
4. Summary and discussion
Using a flexible microeconometric model of household labour supply, we
have simulated behavioural responses and welfare gains and losses for
married couples resulting from replacing the Italian tax system as of 1993 by
three alternative tax-transfer regimes: a flat tax, a negative income tax and a
work-fare system. The flexibility of the model rests upon
– a fully simultaneous representation of partners’ decisions,
– a utility function specification that, although well founded on a substantive
theory of choice, does not force a priori any specific pattern of supply
response with respect to wages or incomes,
– and on a representation of the opportunity set that allows for unobserved
job characteristics and different availability of different types of job.
For the purpose of social welfare evaluation, we draw upon King (1983)
by deriving welfare change measures from equivalent incomes (or indirect
money metric utilities) defined in terms of a reference household and of the
prices that this household faces. The money metric utilities are then aggre-
gated into a social welfare criterion, which allows evaluating the reforms in
terms of efficiency and equality.
As a first notable result, it turns out that all of the reforms are efficient,
and that while FT is disequalising, NIT and WF are also equalising. The
results are robust with respect to the choice of the reference household in
computing welfare effects. Therefore the analysis suggests that there is indeed
scope for designing a system that is superior to the current one according to
both efficiency and equality.
A second striking result is that the main effects produced by the reforms
seem to come from a direction that is very different from the expectations of
most advocates of the reforms themselves. There are two widespread cliche´s
circulating in the discussions about social policy and tax reforms. The first is
the expectation that basic income support policies (NIT, WorkFare etc.)
entail a significant reduction of labour supply in lower income deciles, with
the risk of activating ‘‘poverty traps’’. Our results do not support this view,
and we have discussed likely explanations rooted in realistic – although not
standard - features of the model. Second, most advocates of tax reforms that
reduce the progressivity and the marginal rates applied to higher incomes,
tend to expect that this will give stronger labour supply incentives to
households located in the upper deciles of income distribution. Even this
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expectation receives little support from our results. All the reforms entail a
significant increase of household gross income and a somewhat lower average
tax rate. However, large part of the labour supply contribution comes from
lower and average income households. At the root of these results there are
– the magnitude and the sign of the partners’ labour supply cross-elasticities,
– the structure of the opportunity set in terms of availability of different
types of jobs,
– and a marked inverse dependence of labour supply wage elasticities on
household income.
The last feature above also suggest that NIT or WF might probably be
improved upon moving along unconventional directions, such as lowering
taxes and flattening marginal rates not so much on highest incomes but rather
on low and average incomes.
Appendix
A. The microeconometric model
The model is fully described in Aaberge et al. (2000). A more technical
presentation, with some differences in the empirical specification, is provided
by Aaberge, et al. (1999). General foundations are given in Dagsvik (1994),
and a first application is presented in Aaberge et al. (1995). Here we give a
concise sketch, using the terminology introduced in Sect. 2. Two major
problems have to be faced in developing empirical model of labour supply for
tax reform evaluation:
 complicated tax rules may introduce non-convexities and kink-points into
the budget set that make cumbersome the use of Kuhn-Tucker conditions
associated to constrained utility maximisation;
 the standard textbook model is not able to reproduce well the actual dis-
tribution of hours of work, which is not unimodal but tends instead to
cluster around two or three value ranges (such as, e.g. partime, fulltime and
double shift).
As to the first problem, we follow the strategy of modelling the choice in
terms of a direct comparison of utility levels, thus avoiding the complications
implied by working with conditions involving marginal variations. Under this
respect our model is close to – among others – Dickens and Lundberg (1993),
van Soest (1995) and Duncan and McRae (1999). The model we adopt
follows Dagsvik (1994) and belongs to the Multinomial Logit family, more
precisely to its generalisation to continuous choice sets (as for example in
Ben-Akiva and Watanatada 1981).
As to the second problem, the recent literature has witnessed many dif-
ferent approaches. One consists in introducing into the utility function a
sufficiently large number of parameters – e.g. through a polynomial
approximation – such that the distribution of hours can be rationalised. The
risk of this approach is that it tends to explain everything with the observed
variables (overfitting): it is dubious whether it produces more reliable results -
with respect to simpler utility function specifications – when evaluating policy
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changes or when simulating outside the estimation sample. A different,
alternative or complementary, procedure consists in assuming that there
are fixed costs of working. This refinement can contribute to explain why
very few observations are usually found between, say, non-participation and
18–20 hours a week. Our approach is still different. First, we adopt a utility
function that although flexible is amenable to a direct interpretation of the
parameters in terms of economic theory. Second, we directly model the dis-
tribution of opportunities contained in the choice set, allowing for different
availability of job types for different households.
The choice set Xi for household i contains a certain number (unknown to
the analyst) of ‘‘household opportunities’’, each of them being described by
work hours of work (hF ; hM ), gross wage rates (wF ;wM ) and by other
unobserved characteristics j. The subscripts F and M refer to the wife (Fe-
male) and to the husband (Male). The choice set is modelled through the
definition of the p.d.f. piðhF ; hM ;wF ;wMÞ, which can be interpreted as the
relative frequency (in the choice set) of an opportunities requiring (hF ; hM )
hours, paying wage rates (wF ;wM ). The choice set includes both market
opportunities (jobs) and non-market opportunities (which have all zero
hours and zero wage, but typically differ as to other unobserved charac-
teristics). If (and only if) a certain opportunity contains hj ¼ 0 then it also
contains wj ¼ 0.
We define:
piðhF ;hM ;wF ;wMÞ
¼
phiF ðhF ÞphiMðhM ÞpwiF ðwF ÞpwiM ðwM Þp0iF p0iM forhF >0andhM >0
phiMðhM ÞpwiM ðwM Þð1p0iF Þp0iM forhF ¼0andhM >0
phiF ðhF ÞpwiF ðwF Þp0iF ð1p0iMÞ forhF >0andhM¼0
ð1p0iF Þð1p0iMÞ forhF ¼0andhM¼0
8
>>><
>>>:
ðA:1Þ
where
phijðhjÞ = conditional p.d.f. of opportunities requiring hj hours for gender
j, given hj > 0; it is specified as uniform with a peak corresponding to full-
time;
pwijðwjÞ = conditional p.d.f. of opportunities paying wage wj for gender j,
given hj > 0; it is specified as log-normal, with the mean depending on
Education, Age and Regional dummies; p0ij = proportion (on the opportunity
set) of opportunities with hj > 0 (i.e. of jobs) for gender j; it is specified as
logistic with location parameter depending on regional dummies and on local
gender-specific unemployment rates.
For more details on the empirical specification of the opportunity p.d.f.s
we refer again to Aaberge et al. (1999) and Aaberge et al. (2000).
The utility level attained by household i when choosing a given oppor-
tunity depends however not only on the observed characteristics of the
opportunity (hours and wages) and of the household, but also on unob-
served characteristics. We assume that utility can be factorised as
UiðCi; hiF ; hiM ; zÞ ¼ WiðCi; hiF ; hiMÞ þ eiðzÞ, where e is a random variable
accounting for the joint effect of household’s and opportunity’s unobserved
characteristics. We assume the e s are independent draws from a standard
Type I extreme value distribution, i.e., Prob(e  E) = exp  exp Ef gf g.
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For the systematic utility a Box-Cox functional form is chosen:
WiðC;hF ;hM Þ¼ ½a2þa3N   C
a1 1
a1
 
þ a5þa6 lnAM þa7ðlnAM Þ2
h i
 L
a4
M 1
a4
 
þ a9þa10 lnAF þa11ðlnAF Þ2þa12CU6þa13CO6
h i
 L
a8
F 1
a8
 
ðA:2Þ
where C is annual household net (disposable) income, N is the size of the
household, Aj is the age of gender j, CU6 and CO6 are the number of children
below and above 6 years old and Lj is the proportion of leisure for gender j,
defined as Lj ¼ 1  hj8760 , and hj is annual hours of work.
The functional form chosen for representing utility is flexible in the
sense that it permits many different shapes of labour supply curves and
does not impose a priori any specific dependence of supply from income or
wage. One could assure even more flexibility by - for example - intro-
ducing interaction terms or by using polynomial approximations. Flexi-
bility, however, has to be balanced against other relevant criteria. We
favoured a functional form that – although flexible – still permits a direct
economic interpretation of the parameters. There is also a more funda-
mental motivation for relying on such a form, which is rooted in psy-
chophysical measurement theory. Dagsvik and Strøm (2003) prove that a
form such as (A.2) is consistent with certain invariance assumptions on
preferences. A related, although not equivalent, result was also proved by
Luce (1959).
Given the assumptions above, the probability of observing household i
choosing an opportunity containing hF ; hM ;wF and wM turns out to be
23:
uiðhF ;hM ;wF ;wM Þ¼
exp WiðCi;hF ;hMÞf gpiðhF ;hM ;wF ;wM ÞR R R R
exp WiðZi;yF ;yMÞf gpiðyF ;yM ;xF ;xM ÞdyF dyMdxF dxM
ðA:3Þ
with
Ci ¼ wiF hiF þ wiMhiM þ mi  RðwiF hiF ;wiMhiM ;miÞ
and
Zi ¼ xF yF þ xMyM þ mi  RðxF yF ; xMyM ;mÞ
where R( ) is the tax paid and mi is exogenous income. The choice
probabilities can then be used to jointly estimate the parameters of the
utility function and of the opportunity density functions by Maximum
Likelihood. The estimates are reported in Aaberge et al. (2000)24. The
model performs very well in terms of fit to worked hours and income
distribution, which suggest that the specification of the utility function and
of the opportunity density function are sufficiently flexible to capture the
large behavioural variability present in the sample.
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B. The Italian tax system as of 1993
Here we summarise the main features of the personal income tax system in
1993. The essential characteristics of the systems remain unchanged in the
following years, although there is a movement towards reducing the number
of marginal tax rates, introducing a slightly less progressive profile, and
increasing the amount of the family benefits.
The unit of taxation is the individual. To the individual total taxable
income, the following marginal tax rates are applied:
In our sample (Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth,
1993) the average household gross income and the average taxes paid in our
sample are respectively 54,525,000 ITL and 11,074,000 ITL. Some expendi-
tures (such as medical or insurance) can be deducted from income before
applying taxes. Child allowances (83,100 ITL for each child) and dependent
spouse allowances (719,300 ITL) – up to the amount of the gross tax – can be
subtracted from the tax. Allowances are also granted to wage workers
(690,600 ITL for everyone plus 215,800 ITL if the gross income is below
13,200,000 ITL). For example, one implication of the tax allowances is that
for tax payer with dependent spouse the marginal tax rate attached to the first
bracket is zero. Conditional on the number of household members, on
household total income, and on being a wage worker, the head of the
household receives family benefits. These transfers are comparatively rather
low, besides being conditional on occupational status. For example, a
household with 1 child would receive 720,000 ITL if total household gross
income is below 17,306,000 ITL, 240,000 ITL if income is above 17,306,000
and below 21,632,000, nothing if income is above 21,632,000. The transfers
have been increased since 1993b even in real terms but they remain low in
comparison to other European countries.
Endnotes
1 Ministero delle Finanze (1994)
2 See Commissione Onofri (1997) for analyses and proposals elaborated upon these issues
during the last centre-left government.
3 Ministero del Tesoro (2000).
4 Baldini and Bosi (2001) use a static micro-simulation model to evaluate the effects on income
distribution and on net tax revenue of the two reforms contained in the electoral platforms of
the two opposed coalitions, and conclude that they both are undesirable. The (almost) flat tax
proposal – proposed by the centre-right coalition – would according to the results of Baldini
and Bosi – entail a major loss in revenue; to keep revenue constant an unbearably high rate
Income
(1000 LIT)
Marginal tax
rate (%)
Up to 7,200 10
7,200 – 14,400 22
14,400 – 30,000 27
30,000 – 60,000 34
60,000 – 150,000 41
150,000 – 300,000 46
Over 300,000 51
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would be required. On the other hand, the ‘‘social dividend + flat rate’’ reform – proposed by
the centre–left coalition – would have positive effects on redistribution but again would require
an exceedingly high flat rate to keep the revenue constant. Another example of non–
behavioural simulation analysis of this type of reforms is provided by Bourguignon et al.
(1997).
5 We also checked the sensitivity of the results with respect to the choice of the reference state.
6 A full presentation of the model and more details on data and estimation can be found in
Aaberge et al. (1999) and Aaberge, Colombino, Strøm and Wennemo (2000). Some key
features are illustrated in Appendix A. The model allows for observed as well as unobserved
characteristics in preferences and opportunities, for spouses’ simultaneous decisions, for non–
convex budget sets due to the complexity of the tax system and for quantity constraints on the
choice of hours of work. Previous structural labour supply models estimated on Italian data
include Colombino (1985) and Colombino and Del Boca (1990).
7 The estimates of this specific version of the model are present in Aaberge et al. (2000).
8 The concept must not be confused with the homonymous one used in the equivalence scales
literature.
9 Several authors have discussed rationales for this approach, see e.g., Donaldson and Weymark
(1980, 1983), Weymark (1981), Yaari (1988), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1992) and Aaberge
(2001).
10 Note that fCb;k ; b  2g is the ‘‘generalised’’ Gini family introduced by Mehran (1976). It can
be easily verified that C2k is equal to the Gini coefficient. For unimodal distributions that are
not strongly skew to the right or left the Gini coefficient is most sensitive to changes that take
place in the middle part of the income distribution. As noted by Aaberge (2000) C1k exhibits
strong downside inequality aversion and is equivalent to a measure of inequality that was
introduced by Bonferroni (1930). By contrast, C3k exhibits upside inequality aversion and
therefore yields a supplement to the information provided by the Gini coefficient and the
Bonferroni coefficient.
11 The terminology is taken from King (1983).
12 In the text and in the tables, the figures are in 000’s of Italian Lire. In order to translate into
EURO, the figures should be divided by 1.93627.
13 Another motivation for less progressive tax rates is to reduce the incentives to evasion and
elusion.
14 In this exercise we limit ourselves to the NIT and do not consider the possibly less realistic basic
income in the form of a universal unconditional transfer. The idea of a minimum guaranteed
income or alternatively of a universal basic income or wealth transfer, has a long tradition in
economics and political philosophy and can be traced back to Tom Paine, Charles Fourier and
John Stuart Mill amongst others. More recently, it motivated proposals from scholars with
radically different ideology, from Friedman (1964) to Van Parijs (1995), passing through Tobin
(1966), Meade (1978) and Atkinson (1995) to cite a few. A recent articulated proposal for a
universal transfer in the form of an initial endowment is put forward by Ackerman and Alstott
(1999). Targetti Lenti (2000) provides a survey with focus on the Italian case.
15 In the simulation exercise we put Hmin ¼ 1000 (cumulatively for the two partners).
Alternatively – and more generally – one might think of making the transfer conditional on
some other decision made by the household, such as taking part in a training program.
16 See Fortin et al. (1993).
17 For FT, the marginal tax rate is of course constant for any level of income. For NIT and WF
is the (constant) marginal tax rate applied to incomes above the guaranteed level G.
18 This effect can be due to more participants, and/or more hours worked among participants,
and/or a more productive pool of participants (i.e. a favourable selection effect).
19 It is worthwhile noting that the functional form adopted for representing household utility
(see Appendix A) does not imply a priori any particular relationship between supply elasticity
and household income or individual wage.
20 One would expect a disincentive to participation from FT – since it increases the entrance
marginal tax rate) –, and a poverty trap effect (on top of a disincentive to participation) from
NIT (if not from WF) – since it guarantees an income G even to non-participants and applies
a 100% tax rate up to the point when labour income reaches G. As explained in the main text,
however, these arguments might cease to be valid once it is recognised that not every type of
job – and in particular not every hours value – is equally available.
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21 The results obtained with the three different reference households are reported in a working
paper by Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (2001) that can be downloaded from CHILD web
page (www.child-centre.it).
22 Note that the argument is at odds with a widespread opinion, according to which efficiency
should be pursued by cutting taxes on the highest incomes. See Røed and Strøm (2001) and
Fitoussi (2000) for – respectively – a recent provocative survey and an informed opinion that
also oppose the conventional wisdom.We are using here an argument inspired by the Ramsey –
inverse elasticity – rule, according to which less elastic behaviours should be taxed more in order
to collect a given amount. Of course the argument cannot be used literally in this context since
the criterion that differentiates elasticities (i.e. household income) depends also on the
elasticities themselves. Computations by Saez (2001) seem to give support to the above
conjecture. However Saez uses a calibrated model based on a rather restrictive specification of
preferences. A rigorous analysis fully exploiting the complexity of our empirical model would
require locating the tax rule that maximises social welfare over a general family of tax rules. This
is however computationally very cumbersome, unless the rule can be defined by two or three
parameters as in the exercises illustrate in this paper. We are currently working on extending the
simulation procedure to more general families of tax rules.
23 For the derivation of the choice density see Aaberge et al. (1999). The choice densities are
similar to those produced by the continuous multinomial logit of Ben-Akiva and Watanatada
(1981). The basic versions of the models developed for example by vanSoest (1995) and
Duncan and McRac (1999) can be interpreted as special cases of (A.3) where the p.d.f.s pi are
set equal to a constant.
24 The estimates can be obtained by the authors upon request.
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